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connection with petitioner's tax liability for prior years. A subpoena duces
tecum was issued directing petitioner to produce the records,1 which were
in his possession as general partner. Petitioner, his son, and his son-in-law
were the general partners of each limited partnership involved, with limited
partners ranging from twenty-five to 119 in number and capitalization from
225,000 dollars to 2,740,000 dollars. The partnerships, together with a
management company, were housed in a single office with a staff of one
secretary. Petitioner claimed that the order to deliver the books and records
to the special agent violated his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.2 On appeal from a district court order upholding the subpoena,3 held, affirmed. Where the size and extent of limited partnership
operations show that a general partner's personal interest in the company
books and records is subordinate to the interest of the company as a whole,
the partner is holding the books in a purely representative capacity and
may not claim for himself the privilege against self-incrimination as to the
books subpoenaed. United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963).
Personal papers and records have long been sheltered by the individual's
constitutional protection against self-incrimination.4 Since the privilege is
defined as a purely personal right, it cannot be claimed by a legal entity such
as a corporation,15 although corporations are protected by the fourth amendment sanction against unreasonable searches and seizures.6 Since no person
has standing to refuse testimony by claiming only that the evidence may
incriminate another person, 7 a corporation may not withhold books and
records tending to incriminate one of its officers personally, although the
subpoena is directed to the officer who as record custodian has kept the
corporation books.8 The fact that the corporation must comply with a
Pursuant to INT. REY. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 7402(b), 7602, 7604.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, "No person ••• shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself • • • ."
3 United States v. Silverstein, 210 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
4 Boyd v. United States, ll6 U.S. 616 (1886). The privilege has been held to apply to
any proceeding where the defendant is asked to produce evidence which might tend to
incriminate him of some offense, or subject him to fines, penalties, or forfeitures, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), including a hearing before a special agent of the
Internal Revenue Service, as in the principal case, see, e.g., In re Turner, 309 F.2d 69
(2d Cir. 1962). The claim of privilege must be raised at the first instance of required
production of books and records held by the claimant, even where the initial investigation is civil rather than criminal. E.g., Grant v. United States, 291 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.
1961) (failure to claim privilege at time of civil audit of books by tax examiners). More•
over, the defendant is required at least to bring the subpoenaed material into court so
that the court may make its own determination of the incriminating nature of the
documents. Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928).
G Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). English courts hold to the contrary. Triplex
Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass, [1939] 2 K.B. 395.
6 Hale v. Henkel, supra note 5, at 76.
7 Id. at 69-70.
8 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The same seems to apply even where
the custodian is the sole stockholder and officer of the corporation. See Grant v. United
States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); In re Greenspan, 187 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United
States v. Hoyt, 53 F.2d 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). But see Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp.
1

2

528

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

subpoena seeking its books, which might incriminate one of its officers,
should not be altered by the circumstance that the officer involved has
custody of the books. The denial to corporations and their officers of the
privilege against self-incrimination was extended by the Supreme Court in
United States v. White9 to include non-corporate organizations and their
officers, whenever any such group is found to more nearly embody a common or group interest rather than the purely personal interests of its members.10
Discussion of the policy bases of the organizational exception to the
claim of privilege usually centers on the distinction between intimidation
of the individual and of an impersonal entity. 11 In addition, three justifications are offered for denial of the right to custodians of organizational
records. The first theory, advanced in the principal case,12 is that by choosing a purely statutory form of business organization, a corporation or
limited partnership and its constituents thereby elect to submit to the
visitatorial power of the state over the company's record of dealings. This
argument is unsatisfactory because it simply begs the question; the issue is
whether that power may constitutionally be exercised.18 Moreover, it fails
to justify the exception in the case of a non-corporate group,14 and has no
application to an order by a federal agency for books of a state-chartered
company. In neither of these two cases has the organization submitted to
the visitatorial power of the authority actually demanding the evidence.
322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Despite the courts' refusal to allow organizational custodians to claim
the privilege against self-incrimination when ordered to produce books and records
which they hold, the government's subpoena power is still restricted by the unreasonable
search and seizure sanction, Fleming v. Montgomery Ward &: Co., II4 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 3ll U.S. 690 (1940), and by the inability to elicit oral testimony from the
officer other than to identify the records produced, Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S.
II8 (1957); United States v. Daisart Sportswear, Inc., 169 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1948); United
States v. Pollock, 201 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Ark. 1962). The issuer of the subpoena must
also prove that the records actually exist, and that they are within the control and
possession of the subpoenaed party. Curcio v. United States, supra; United States v.
Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955).
!l 322 U.S. 694 (1944), involving a subpoena directed to an officer of a labor union
ordering him to produce certain books and records of the union.
10 Id. at 701.
11 Thus it is said that fear of intimidation of the witness, from which the right
against self-incrimination historically grew, has no bearing upon written evidence gathered
from impersonal groups. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259a (McNaughton rev. 1961).
12 Principal case at 791.
18 See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note II, § 2259b. This visitatorial power theory
underlies the categorical approach taken in cases involving corporate officers. See note
8 supra. The notion is closely related to the much-criticized public records doctrine,
which would subject all records required to be kept by law to the state's inspection for
any purpose. The doctrine was applied in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. I (1948),
but sharply criticized in Spilky, Have We Lost Our Civil Rights in Tax Matters?, 37
TAXES 603 (1959).
14 While a limited partnership, such as that in the principal case, is a state-chartered
form of business association, the visitatorial power argument fails both for lack of an
answer to the constitutional question, see note 13 supra, and because of the dangers of
strict categorization, see note 29 infra and accompanying text.
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Second, the argument is made that the custodian must share his view of
the books with any stockholder, partner, or limited partner who wishes to
see them. As justification for a requirement that the custodian tum over
the records to the government, this idea is irrelevant; the fact that someone
other than the custodian has the right to see the company's books is no
reason why a government should share that right. 15 Finally, some suggest
that effective law enforcement in the case of large enterprises faces special
difficulties of proof not found in proceedings against individuals.16 Such a
policy, however, is not applicable to an investigation of individual criminality, as in the principal case.
The argument for effective law enforcement as a justification for denial
of the privilege to organizational record custodians reveals most strikingly
the common failure of the courts to recognize that in many cases the record
of a company's dealings may be equated with the dealings of an individual.
If the individual custodian can show that the acts of his company are in
fact his acts, executed in great measure in his own personal interest, then
he should be allowed to withhold self-incriminating company records of
those acts. In the White case the Supreme Court provided at least a clue
to the determination of such an identity of company and personal action:
"The test . . . is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot
be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests
of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group
interests only."11
The Court apparently meant this test to apply only to a claim of privilege
by the organization itself, and by its officers acting in an official capacity; 18
the Court brushed aside the defendant's claim of self-incrimination on his
own behalf by noting that he had not shown that included in the group
records were any of "his own private papers.'' 19 In subsequent organizational cases the Court has never fully applied the White test; rather, in
most instances the White case has been cited in support of summary conclusions that organizations represented by defendant custodians were impersonal.20 Lower court cases involving partnerships have, however, applied the test to determine the impersonal nature of the partnership in
each case.21 In the only case in which it was argued that the White test
15 See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 11,
16 Sec ibid.
17

§ 2259b.

United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).

1s Ibid.
19 Id. at 704.
20 Sec, e.g., McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960) (Civil Rights Congress);
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. ll8 (1957) (labor union); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367 (1951) (Communist Party of Denver); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349
(1950) ijoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee).
21 Privilege upheld: United States v. Linen Serv. Council, 141 F. Supp. 5ll (D.N.J.
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applied only to pleas of self-incrimination by organizations and not to
cases of individual claims of self-incrimination, the court rejected the argument, holding that, regardless of who is in danger of being incriminated,
the records must still be held in a purely personal capacity if the privilege
is to apply.22 This answer is correct if it means that in each case the test of
the organization's personal or impersonal structure will show whether both
the custodian on his own behalf and the organization itself may claim the
privilege, or whether the organization is so impersonal that no one's individual acts may be equated with the group's acts. The issue, in a claim
by either the individual or by the group, is the possible identity of personal
and company dealings recorded in the subpoenaed material. If no such
identity exists, neither the entity nor the individual has the right to withhold records. This will be a question of degree in most cases, since all
organizations represent both personal and group interests to a certain
extent.
The principal case, the first to face squarely the problem of a claim of
the privilege against self-incrimination by a general partner of a limited
partnership created under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,28 seems
tacitly to recognize the distinction between wholly impersonal group acts
and personal acts which may be identical in nature to the dealings of the
entity. Despite an unfortunately drawn analogy between the nature of the
limited partnerships involved and the structure of a corporation,24 the
court applied the White test to find that the limited partnerships were impersonal in structure and operation. This conclusion was based almost
solely on the size of the capital fund and the number of limited partners
in each company. In support of this limited examination, the court found
authority in the emphasis which the White decision placed upon the scope
of membership and activities as showing the impersonal nature of a group.
By thus narrowing the range of the inquiry, the court may have overlooked
other elements which are important in determining the personal or impersonal character of company acts.
1956); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948). Privilege denied:
United States v. Wemes, 157 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1946); United States v. Onassis, 1!13
F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954).
One pre-White case held the privilege applicable to a partnership. United States v.
Brasley, 268 Fed. 59 (W .D. Pa. 1920).
United States v. Wemes, supra note 21.
8 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED. Since its promulgation in 1915, thirty-seven states
have adopted this uniform act. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAw §§ 90-119.
24 Principal case at 791. Since general partners bear a far greater burden as to both
control and assumption of personal liability in a limited partnership than do corporate
officers, this analogy is inaccurate. See statutes cited notes 25 & 26 infra. Such a comparison may have an undesirable impact upon subsequent cases involving claims of selfincrimination by limited partnerships should the courts use the same categorical approach
as was applied in the one-man corporation cases cited note 8 supra. Cf. 46 IowA L. REv.
632 (1961). A better comparison may be found in cases involving business or Massachusetts trusts. See United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894
(1951); Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1935); United States v. Invader
Oil Corp., 5 F.2d 715 (S.D. Cal. 1925).
22
23
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Where a limited partnership is involved, at least four elements sliould
be relevant to the test of impersonality. The restriction against participation by any but general partners in the control and management of the
limited partnership25 indicates a more personal type of control than is
present in the typical corporation. The peculiar form of liability for the
limited partnership's debts shouldered by each individual member also
shows a high personal stake of the general partner in the acts of the company; each general partner is liable for the debts of the whole enterprise,26
as in ordinary partnerships, while limited partners are liable only to the
extent of their investment,27 as with corporate stockholders. On the other
hand, any limited partnership is impersonal when measured by the interest which each limited partner has in the profit of the venture.28 To that
end, as the court pointed out in the principal case, each limited partner
has the right to inspect the company books and to receive a full accounting
at any time.29 The court, however, also considered the statutory means by
which the limited partnership is created as an additional controlling factor
in the determination of impersonality of the organizational structure.
While a limited partnership is certainly a creature of statute,80 this argument is questionable: first, because attention to the visitatorial power of
the state forces the court to a strict categorization of a group as "statelicensed-therefore-impersonal," and second, because the method of formation is irrelevant to the question of operational structure. The amount of
capitalization and number of partners, both general and limited, may have
evidentiary value as to the impersonal nature of each group,81 but should
not be controlling as against the personal factors represented by the total
control exercised by, and special liability borne by, the general partners.
If physical size and the availability of particular state sanctions are accepted
as important factors in determining the impersonal character of a group,
then every limited partnership can be found impersonal. If the limited
partners' stake in the company's profits is sufficient to place the organization in the impersonal category, small partnerships desiring to use the
limited partnership device to reach additional funds must be prepared,
in return for the privilege of obtaining increased capital, to give up any
rights, as individuals or entities, to withhold books and records from
Ac:r § 7.
A<::r § 9.
27 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Ac:r § 7. Limited partners may even transact business and deal with the firm in the same manner as strangers. See 56 MICH. L. REv. 285
(1957).
28 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP A<::r § 10.
29 Ibid. This fact is pertinent at this point in the analysis of structure for signs of
impersonality, whereas the right of limited partners to see the company books and
records is irrelevant as a policy basis for the exception to the self-incrimination privilege
made for organizational record custodians.
80 See Nadler, The Limited Partnership Under the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, 65 CoM. L.J. 71 (1960).
81 See especially the two Onassis cases cited note 21 supra.
25 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
26 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
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governmental inspection. Upon fuller consideration, however, the elements
of control and liability, in the typical limited partnership, should show that
most such companies are more personal than impersonal, at least where
the number of general partners is small. Thus a general partner should be
allowed his right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination as to the
company books and records. As the court so correctly admitted,82 the fact
that such a general partner was unable to do so in the principal case reveals
forcefully the personal danger to individuals inherent in the organizational
records exception to the privilege against self-incrimination.

Roger L. McManus
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Principal case at 791.

